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Abstract
Following incidents in the Asia-Pacific region where coastal States 
have disputed the rights of other States to conduct hydrographic sur­
veys, military surveys and military intelligence collection activities in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) without their prior consent, a series of unofficial (or ‘Track Two ') 
meetings has been held around the region to address relevant issues. The last of 
these meetings was held in Tokyo in September 2005 when agreement was reached 
on Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone. This 
paper discusses the background to these guidelines, including the reasons why they 
are considered necessary, the incidents that have occurred in the region, and the 
main contentious issues that have arisen between coastal and investigating States.
mm Résumé
J K  A la suite des incidents survenus dans la région de l'Asie et du 
Pacifique où les Etats côtiers ont contesté les droits d ’autres Etats 
d'exécuter des levés hydrographiques, des levés militaires et des activités de col­
lecte de renseignements militaires dans leur Zone Économique Exclusive (ZEE), 
sans leur consentement préalable, une série de réunions non officielles a été organ­
isée dans la région afin de traiter de questions y  relatives. Lors de la dernière de 
ces réunions qui s'est déroulée à Tokyo, en septembre 2005, un accord a été trou­
vé sur les directives en matière de navigation et concernant le survol de la zone 
économique exclusive. Cet article traite du fondement de ces directives, y  compris 
des raisons pour lesquelles elles sont jugées nécessaires, des incidents survenus 
dans la région ainsi que des principaux points de litige survenus entre les Etats 
côtiers et les Etats qui effectuent des opérations d ’investigation.
Resumen
Posteriormente a los incidentes acaecidos en la region de Asia-Pacîfi- 
co, donde los Estados costeros se han disputado los derechos de 
otros Estados a efectuar levantamientos hidrogràficos, levantamientos militares y  
actividades de recogida de datos de inteligencia militar en la Zona Econômica Exclu- 
siva (ZEE) sin su consentimiento previo, se han celebrado una serie de reuniones no 
oficiales (o ‘Paralelas’) alrededor de la region para tratar temas pertinentes. La ulti­
ma de estas reuniones se celebrô en Tokio en Septiembre del 2005, donde se llegô 
a un acuerdo sobre las Directivas para la Navegaciôn y  Sobrevuelo en la Zona 
Econômica Exclusiva. Este artîculo trata sobre los antecedentes de estas directivas, 
incluyendo las razones por las que se consideran necesarias, los incidentes que han 
tenido lugar en la region y  los temas contenciosos principales que han surgido entre 
los Estados costeros e investigadores.
Introduction
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime was a 
major development in the international law of the 
sea, which emerged from the Third UN Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) that culminated 
in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). Military activities in the EEZ were a con­
troversial issue at UNCLOS III and continue to be 
so in State practice. Some coastal States claim 
that other States cannot carry out military activi­
ties in or over their EEZs without their consent, and 
have sought to apply restrictions on navigation and 
overflight in their EEZs that are not accepted by 
other States.
Hydrographic surveying has become caught up in 
this controversy. This is largely because the United 
States has likened ‘military surveys’ to hydro- 
graphic surveys claiming that both types of survey 
are related to the freedoms of navigation and over­
flight available to other States in the EEZ of a 
coastal State. As UNCLOS Part XIII and Article 
56(l)(b)(ii) bring marine scientific research in the 
EEZ clearly under the jurisdiction of the coastal 
State, the validity of the claimed similarity between 
military and hydrographic surveying depends large­
ly on maintaining a distinction between hydrograph­
ic surveying and marine scientific research.
The issues involved have become particularly con­
tentious in the Asia-Pacific region where there has 
been a series of incidents and disputes that could 
easily have spiralled out of control into open con­
flict. With the aims of clarifying the rights and 
duties of both coastal States and user States in an 
EEZ, and of providing an important regional Mari­
time Confidence and Security Building Measure 
(MCSBM), a group of senior officials, legal experts 
and maritime specialists (now known as the EEZ 
Group 21) has been meeting in the region to 
address relevant issues. The meetings have been 
sponsored primarily by the Ship and Ocean Founda­
tion of Japan (now the Ocean Policy Research Foun­
dation) with the objective of producing a set of non­
binding, voluntary principles ( ’Guidelines’), which 
would provide the basis for a common understand­
ing and approach to issues arising from the imple­
mentation of the EEZ regime.
The last meeting of the EEZ Group 21 held in 
Tokyo, 15-16 September 2005, reached agreement
on ‘Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone’. The proposed Guide­
lines are non-binding in nature. They set out broad 
principles of common understanding regarding cer­
tain aspects of navigation and overflight in the 
EEZ, including military and intelligence gathering 
activities, but do not create legally binding obliga­
tions between States. In keeping with their non­
binding nature, the Guidelines are framed in exhor- 
tatory rather than obligatory language. They may 
be generally regarded as reflecting the need for 
better understanding of the rights and obligations 
of States conducting activities in the EEZ of anoth­
er country. They represent a consensus among the 
Group 21 members on issues that are at present 
contentious and a potential source of tension and 
dispute in the region. The introduction to the Guide­
lines, the Guidelines themselves and the member­
ship of EEZ Group 21 are attached as Annexes A, 
B and C respectively to this paper.
The proposed Guidelines reflect a consensus in 
the EEZ Group 21 that trends over the years with 
technology and the wider utility of hydrographic 
data have brought hydrographic surveying and 
marine scientific research much closer together. 
Perhaps paradoxically, the arguments for purely 
military surveys in the EEZ being outside the juris­
diction of the coastal State are now stronger than 
those supporting an unrestricted right to conduct 
hydrographic surveying in the EEZ without the per­
mission of the coastal State. This paper traces the 
process and arguments by which this consensus 
was reached.
Background
Negotiation of the EEZ regime at UNCLOS III was 
difficult and complex with widely divergent points 
of view about the status of the new zone. One 
major group, the ‘territorialists’, mainly comprising 
developing countries, saw the EEZ as an extension 
of national jurisdiction in which the coastal States 
would enjoy sovereignty subject to certain limita­
tions. However, this position was sharply disputed 
by the maritime powers, led by the United States 
and the then Soviet Union, who saw the zone as a 
part of the high seas where coastal States had 
some rights over offshore resources. The compro­
mise reached was that the EEZ should be regarded 
as a separate zone in its own right ( ‘sui generis’),
which was neither high sea nor territorial sea 
(Churchill and Lowe, 1999, p.166).
Now some twenty-five years later, this political ‘tug 
of war’ has not gone away. The United States has 
steadfastly maintained a liberal interpretation of 
the rights and freedoms other States enjoy in the 
EEZ of a coastal State, and has coined the expres­
sion ‘international waters’ to describe collectively 
the high seas, the EEZ and the contiguous zone 
(Thomas and Duncan, 1999, p. 19). On the other 
hand, some coastal States have sought to 
strengthen the extent of their jurisdiction over their 
EEZ by for example, claiming that other States 
should only conduct military activities in that zone 
with their consent.
In particular, different opinions exist as to whether 
coastal State jurisdiction extends to hydrographic 
surveying and the collection of other marine envi­
ronmental data that is not resource-related or is 
not done for scientific purposes. While UNCLOS 
has established a clear regime for marine scientif­
ic research, there is no specific provision in the 
Convention for hydrographic surveying. Some 
coastal States require consent with respect to 
hydrographic surveys conducted in their EEZ by 
other States while it is the opinion of other States 
that hydrographic surveys can be conducted freely 
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flight and other 
in te rn a t io n a l 
lawful uses of 
the sea related 
to those free­
doms, and conducted with due regard to the rights 
and duties of the coastal State (CSCAP, 2002, foot­
note 3, p.3). The position of the United States is 
that while coastal State consent must be obtained 
in order to conduct marine scientific research in its 
EEZ, the coastal State cannot regulate hydrograph­
ic surveys or military surveys conducted beyond its 
territorial sea, nor can it require notification of 
such activities (Thomas and Duncan, 1999, p. 
130). Similarly, the United Kingdom regards Mili­
tary Data Gathering (MDG) as a fundamental high 
seas freedom available in the EEZ. However, other 
States, including China, have specifically claimed 
that hydrographic surveys might only be conducted 
in their EEZs with their consent (SOF and EWC, 
2003, p.7). In December 2002, China announced 
that it had enacted a new law explicitly requiring 
Chinese approval of all survey and mapping activi­
ties in China’s EEZ and stating that unapproved 
ocean-survey activity will be subject to fines and 
confiscation of equipment and data (SOF and EWC,
2003, p.39).
These issues are proving particularly problematic 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Large areas of this region 
are enclosed as EEZ by one country or another, 
and many regional countries have large EEZs in 
which they tend to jealously protect their rights, 
particularly at a time when countries are paying 
much greater attention to the resource potential of 
their offshore areas. Furthermore, there are many 
conflicting and overlapping claims to maritime juris­
diction in the region and relatively few maritime 
boundaries have been agreed. Meanwhile, naval 
capabilities in the region are improving rapidly and 
increased attention is being given to intelligence 
collection and marine environmental research to 
support naval operations. To some extent, the EEZ 
regime has been a cause of maritime militarisation 
in the region with the protection of large maritime 
zones and marine resources, along with the exis­
tence of conflicting claims to offshore areas, often 
being used as justification for acquiring new mari­
time capabilities, including missile- armed patrol 
vessels and maritime strike aircraft.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
incidents have already occurred involving disputes 
between coastal States and other States over their 
respective rights and duties in the EEZ. Research 
vessels claiming to be conducting military surveys 
have been warned out of the EEZs of some coastal 
States, a Chinese fighter aircraft crashed after col­
liding with a U.S. intelligence collection aircraft in 
China’s EEZ off Hainan in April 2001, and alleged 
‘spy ships’ have been pursued out of Japan’s EEZ 
with one vessel even being sunk after hot pursuit 
into China's EEZ. Coastal State legislation and off­
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shore activities are beginning to conflict with 
increasing naval activities of non-coastal States in 
the region, including exercises, intelligence gather­
ing and research, and their accompanying techno­
logical developments.
The explanation of these disputes can be traced 
back to the considerable ambiguity in the EEZ 
regime, as established by UNCLOS, and a range of 
perspectives in Asia with regard to interpreting and 
implementing the regime. Agreement on the EEZ 
concept at UNCLOS III included many compromises 
between coastal States and maritime powers 
resulting in intentional ambiguity in some of its pro­
visions. It was formulated more than 25 years ago 
in very different political and technological circum­
stances than those that exist at present. Tensions 
and misunderstandings may increase unless some 
greater clarity and awareness of the EEZ regime is 
provided and agreed.
Balance of Rights and Duties
The basic problem with the EEZ regime lies in the 
need to find an appropriate balance between the 
rights and duties of the coastal State and those of 
other States (Churchill and Lowe, 1999, p.175). In 
the EEZ, coastal States have sovereign rights over 
natural resources, both living and non-living, and 
other economic activities, such as the production of 
energy from water current and winds (UNCLOS Arti­
cle 56(l)(a)). They also have jurisdiction with regard 
to the establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures; marine scientific 
research; and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment (including the conservation of 
species), as well as other rights and duties, as pro­
vided for in UNCLOS Articles 56(l)(b) and (c)). How­
ever, the sovereign rights to marine resources 
gained under the EEZ regime are not without their 
costs in terms of obligations of the coastal State for 
preserving and protecting the marine environment 
and conserving species in the EEZ, and for having 
due regard to the rights and duties of other States 
in its EEZ (UNCLOS Article 56(2)).
All other states have freedom of navigation and over­
flight in the EEZ, as well as the freedom to lay sub­
marine cables and pipelines, and other internation­
ally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms 
(UNCLOS Article 58(1)). However, in exercising
these freedoms, other States are required to have 
due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal 
State (UNCLOS Article 58(3)). It has proven very dif­
ficult to define an operational test to distinguish 
between an action that has due regard to the rights 
and duties of the other party, and one that does not.
A view from the United States is that the EEZ 
regime "does not permit the coastal state to limit 
traditional non-resources related high seas activi­
ties in this EEZ, such as task force manoeuvring, 
flight operations, military exercises, telecommuni­
cations and space activities, intelligence and sur­
veillance activities, marine data collection, and 
weapons’ testing and firing" (Doran, 1995, p.341). 
Those words were written about ten years ago and 
would most likely now be qualified at least by 
recognition of the need for such activities to be 
conducted with due regard to the rights and duties 
of the coastal State. For example, scheduling an 
exercise in an area of intensive fishing activity 
declared by the coastal State, or in a marine park 
or marine protected area declared by the coastal 
State as required by UNCLOS Article 194(5), could 
be considered not to have due regard to the rights 
and duties of the coastal State.
Marine Scientific Research
UNCLOS does not define the key terms ‘marine sci­
entific research’, ‘survey activities', ‘hydrographic 
survey’, or ‘military survey’ (Galdorisi and Vienna, 
1997, p.164). Indeed attempts at UNCLOS III to 
include a definition of marine scientific research in 
the Convention were not successful (Soons, 1994, 
p.6). Marine scientific research is the general term 
used to describe those activities undertaken in 
ocean and coastal waters to expand scientific 
knowledge of the marine environment (Thomas and 
Duncan, 1999, footnote 50, p.21). There is a ten­
dency in practice to use the term ‘marine scientif­
ic research’ loosely when referring to all kinds of 
data collection (research) conducted at sea. How­
ever, not all data collection conducted at sea nec­
essarily comes within the scope of the marine sci­
entific research regime established by UNCLOS 
Part XIII. Many argue that other activities, such as 
resource exploration, prospecting and hydrographic 
surveying are governed by different legal regimes. 
However, these activities may be difficult to distin­
guish in practice (Bateman, 2005, pp. 166-169),
and this is a large part of the problem.
UNCLOS Part XIII provides that coastal States have 
the exclusive right to regulate, authorise and conduct 
marine scientific research in their EEZ (including the 
contiguous zone) and on their continental shelf. Part 
XIII then establishes an implied consent regime that 
allows other States and competent international 
organisations to proceed with a marine scientific 
research project in the EEZ or on the continental 
shelf under certain circumstances even though the 
consent of the coastal State may not have been 
forthcoming in accordance with the procedures in 
UNCLOS Articles 246-252. In normal circumstances, 
the coastal State shall grant its consent to marine 
scientific research projects carried out for peaceful 
purposes in order to increase scientific knowledge of 
the marine environment (sometimes characterised 
as ‘pure’ scientific research) (UNCLOS Article 
246(3)). The coastal State is to ensure that such 
consent will not be delayed or unreasonably denied 
although UNCLOS Article 246(5) sets out several 
specific situations when the coastal State may with­
hold consent (including when such research is of 
direct significance to the exploration and exploitation 
of natural resources, both living and non-living).
Hydrographic Surveying
Hydrographic surveying is listed in UNCLOS Article 
21(l)(g), along with marine scientific research, as 
an activity under the jurisdiction of the coastal State 
in the territorial sea. UNCLOS Article 19(2)(j) pro­
hibits ‘research or survey activities’ generally during 
innocent passage through the territorial sea, and 
UNCLOS Article 40 states that foreign marine scien­
tific research and hydrographic ships may not carry 
out any research or survey activities during transit 
passage through a strait used for international navi­
gation without the prior authorisation of the coastal 
State. This latter article also applies to archipelagic 
sea lanes passage under UNCLOS Article 54. Hydro- 
graphic surveying is not mentioned in Part V of UNC­
LOS dealing with the EEZ or indeed anywhere else in 
the Convention. The primary use of the data collect­
ed by hydrographic surveys is to compile nautical 
charts, and other documents to facilitate and 
ensure the safety of navigation and for use by others 
concerned with the marine environment such as 
ocean engineers, oceanographers, marine biologists 
and environmental scientists.
Because surveying is mentioned separately to 
marine scientific research in several UNCLOS arti­
cles, it is argued that hydrographic surveying is not 
part of the marine scientific research regime 
(Soons, 1982, p.125). For example, Soons consid­
ers that hydrographic surveying might be regarded 
as an internationally lawful use of the sea associ­
ated with the operation of ships or submarine 
cables and pipelines in accordance with Article 58 
of UNCLOS, and can therefore be conducted freely 
in the EEZ Soons, 1982, p.157). However, it would 
be subject to coastal State jurisdiction if the activ­
ity were in connection with the exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources of the zone. 
This would be the case, for example, if the hydro- 
graphic survey was being conducted as preliminary 
to, or in conjunction with a geophysical investiga­
tion of the oil and gas potential of a particular sea 
area.
In operational terms, hydrographic surveying is 
invariably a clear and distinct activity that, despite 
its use of similar equipments to that used in other 
forms of marine scientific research, is not easily 
confused with other forms of marine scientific 
research. It is fairly obvious when a ship is con­
ducting a hydrographic survey. It will be underway 
and following a regular pattern of sounding lines 
whereas a ship undertaking other activities, includ­
ing oceanographic research and military surveys, 
may be more random in its movements stopping on 
occasions to conduct experiments or to take bot­
tom samples. Similarly an aircraft undertaking a 
hydrographic survey, using Light Detection and 
Ranging (LIDAR) equipment, will be flying a fixed 
and systematic path. Conceivably submarines 
could undertake hydrographic surveys but if the 
data was only for the safety of surface navigation, 
their use would not be economic.
Military Surveys
Military surveys are activities undertaken in the 
ocean and coastal waters involving marine data 
collection (whether or not classified) for military 
purposes (Roach and Smith, 1994, p. 248). Such 
data is important, even essential, for effective sub­
marine operations, Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW), 
Mine warfare and Mine Countermeasures (MCM), 
particularly in waters such as the South and East 
China Seas where oceanographic and underwater 
acoustic conditions vary widely with uneven bottom
topography, fast tidal streams and a relatively high 
level of marine life. Roach and Smith have 
observed that:
Military surveys can include oceanograph­
ic, marine geological, geophysical, chemi­
cal, biological and acoustic data. Equip­
ment used can include fathometers, swath 
bottom mappers, side scan sonars, bot­
tom grab and coring systems, current 
meters and profilers. While the means of 
data collection used in military surveys 
may sometimes be the same as that used 
in marine scientific research, information 
from such activities, regardless of security 
classification, is intended not for use by 
the general scientific community, but by 
the military (Roach and Smith, 1994, p.
248).
China took military action and lodged protests over 
'hydrographic survey' operations by the USNS Bowditch 
(AGS-21) in China's EEZ in 2000 and again in 2002. 
Bowditch is one of the seven Oceanographic Survey 
Ships that are part of the 24 ships in the U.S. Military 
Sealift Command's Special Mission Ships Program 
(Photo courtesy of the US Military Sealift Command, 
www. msc. navy, mil)
Military surveying is an expression largely coined by 
the United States. The United Kingdom talks about 
MDG in similar vein but the term ‘military data gath­
ering’ may be less problematic because it does not 
include the word ‘survey’. These terms are not 
specifically addressed by UNCLOS, and there is no 
language stating or implying that coastal States may 
regulate their conduct in any manner by coastal 
States outside their territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters (Roach and Smith, 1994, p. 248). Thus the 
United States "reserves the right to engage in mili­
tary surveys outside foreign territorial seas and arch­
ipelagic waters", and that to "provide prior notice or 
request permission would create an adverse prece­
dent for restrictions on mobility and flexibility of mili­
tary survey operation" (Roach and Smith, 1994, p.
249). Similarly the United Kingdom believes that 
States have a right to engage in MDG anywhere out­
side foreign territorial seas and archipelagic waters 
without prior notice to, or permission from the 
coastal State.
Some military intelligence collection activities con­
ducted in the EEZ might also be considered as com­
ing within the scope of ‘scientific research’, and thus 
within the scope of the marine scientific research 
regime in the UNCLOS (SOF and EWC, 2003, p.6). 
However, the United States and other maritime pow­
ers are strongly of the view that while these activities 
are within the scope of research, they are associat­
ed with the freedoms of navigation and overflight in 
the EEZ and not under the jurisdiction of the coastal 
State. Intelligence collection data is only used for mil­
itary purposes and is not released for public purpos­
es. Again the boundaries between ‘military surveys’ 
and ‘intelligence collection’ may be difficult to deter­
mine, and one vessel may concurrently undertake 
both activities although the external appearance of 
the vessel (e.g. the aerials on a signals or electronic 
intelligence vessel), the equipment it is operating 
(e.g. the type of sonar), and its movements (e.g. 
whether it is manoeuvring, stopping or continually 
underway) should give a good lead on the nature of 
its data collection.
Based on current and planned asset acquisitions in 
the Asia-Pacific region, military surveying and intelli­
gence gathering activities in EEZs are likely to 
become more controversial and more dangerous in 
the future. In Asia, the disturbing prospects reflect 
the increasing (and changing) demands for technical 
intelligence; robust weapons acquisition programs, 
and especially the increasing Electronic Warfare (EW) 
capabilities; and the widespread moves to develop 
Information Warfare (IW) capabilities. Regional coun­
tries are expanding or developing submarine forces 
and face a need to expand their oceanographic 
knowledge. The scale and scope of intelligence col­
lection activities are likely to expand rapidly over the 
next decade, involving levels and sorts of activities 
quite unprecedented in the past. They will not only 
become more intensive; they will generally be more 
intrusive. These factors all point to the importance of
confidence-building measures such as the proposed 
Guidelines.
Development of the Guidelines
The meetings in Bali (June 2002), Tokyo (February 
2003), Honolulu (December 2003), Shanghai (Octo­
ber 2004), and Tokyo (September 2005) were 
designed to delineate the issues and the areas of 
agreement and disagreement, and to identify and dis­
cuss possible voluntary guidelines for such activities, 
which could reduce conflict potential. Topics covered 
included recent incidents, operational modalities of 
various navies and their rules of engagement, the 
meaning of key terms, initiatives to enhance mari­
time security, intelligence collection operations and 
EEZs, means and manner of implementation and 
enforcement of any agreed rules, options for resolv­
ing disagreements, and the way forward.
The title of the meetings ‘The Regime of the Exclu­
sive Economic Zone: Issues and Responses’ 
implies that they looked at the EEZ regime in an all- 
embracing fashion but this was not the case. The 
meetings focused mainly on the rights and duties 
of States with regard to the conduct of military 
activities, surveys and intelligence collection in the 
EEZs. They paid little attention to the host of other 
issues associated with implementing the regime, 
such as the conservation and utilisation of living 
resources and the rights of land-locked and geo­
graphically disadvantaged States. The main arti­
cles of UNCLOS addressed at the meetings were 
Articles 56, 58 and to a somewhat lesser extent, 
59. However, they did not consider the full extent 
of the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal 
State in its EEZ (Article 56) or indeed, all the rights 
and duties of other States in the EEZ of a foreign 
State (Article 58). Most attention with the latter 
was on activities related to the freedoms of naviga­
tion and overflight, and operations by foreign ships 
and aircraft in an EEZ.
Areas of Agreement
There was agreement that the EEZ is a zone sui 
generis, and that the term ‘international waters' 
used by the United States is misleading. There was 
also agreement that the exercise of the freedom of 
navigation and overflight in and above EEZs should
not interfere with, or undermine the rights or abili­
ty of coastal States to protect and manage their 
own resources and environment. Moreover, there 
was agreement that the exercise of such freedoms 
should not be for the purpose of marine scientific 
research without coastal State consent subject 
only to the principle of ‘implied consent’ set out in 
UNCLOS Article 252. Participants also agreed on 
the importance of ‘due regard’ and that the princi­
ple applies to both the coastal State and to a user 
State. There was also recognition that the interpre­
tation of international law is not static, and that the 
understanding of the rights and duties of States in 
the EEZ continues to evolve.
Areas of Disagreem ent
Areas of disagreement during the meetings gener­
ally related to the meaning of terms in the Conven­
tion as well as to the meaning of specific articles. 
For example, there are specific differences with 
regard to the meaning of 'freedom' of navigation 
and overflight in and above the EEZ, i.e. whether 
this freedom can be limited by certain regulations 
by the coastal State, or whether such freedoms are 
absolute.
M ilitary Activ ities
There are different interpretations regarding the pre­
cise meaning of the Convention's phrase allowing 
‘other internationally lawful uses’ of the sea in the 
EEZ, as in UNCLOS Article 58(1), and the nature of 
the military activities that this phrase might include. 
The interpretation of this phrase can in turn be 
affected by the interpretation of such terms as ‘due 
regard’, ‘abuse of rights’, ‘peaceful purposes’, and 
the obligation not to threaten or use force against 
other States. In this context, questions arise as to 
whether some military and intelligence gathering 
activities are a lawful exercise of the freedom of nav­
igation and overflight, whether they are an abuse of 
rights, whether they pay "due regard" to the inter­
ests of the coastal State, and whether they are a 
threat to the peace and security of the coastal 
State.
Due Regard
There is a considerable range of opinion regarding 
the meaning of ‘due regard’. Some countries, e.g. 
the United States, interpret ‘due regard’ as requir­
ing any user State to refrain from activities that
unreasonably interfere with the exercise of the 
rights of the coastal State. However, others like 
China, for example, appear to interpret ‘due 
regard’ as requiring foreign users of the EEZ to 
refrain from activities which endanger the sover­
eignty, security and national interest of the coastal 
State. An interpretation applicable to many cases 
would be whether the activity interferes with the 
rights and interests of the other State. But there is 
no agreement as to what constitutes such rights 
and interests, whether the interference must be 
unreasonable, and whether it must be actual or 
potential.
Dispute Settlement
There is also disagreement on how to deal with 
these uncertainties. But leaving the problem unre­
solved could be dangerous. Incidents are occurring 
more frequently and even if bilateral arrangements 
are agreed, their rules may differ depending on the 
countries and circumstances. The majority of EEZ 
Group 21 participants shared the concern that 
national governments may deal with these matters 
unilaterally in order to protect their security and 
other interests. If numerous coastal States were to 
enact unilateral national legislation prohibiting the 
exercise of military and intelligence gathering activ­
ities in and above their EEZ, then the prohibition 
against conducting such exercises could become 
part of customary international law through State 
practice, despite the opposition of some countries, 
particularly if those countries are not parties to 
UNCLOS.
Failing the unlikely resolution of these issues by 
the International Court of Justice or the Internation­
al Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, these disputes 
will be addressed through a chaotic and disorderly 
process whereby countries assert and defend their 
positions through State practice, followed by 
protests by countries that disagree, and eventually 
by the give and take of diplomatic negotiations. It 
is in this context of avoiding unilateralism that may 
lead to conflict and of providing a common basis 
for bilateral and multilateral agreements that this 
dialogue and the Guidelines were developed.
Consensus
While there continues to be some disagreement 
whether some military intelligence gathering and
‘hydrographic surveys’ are marine scientific research 
and thus under the jurisdiction of the coastal State 
per UNCLOS Articles 56 (l)(b)(ii) and 246, consen­
sus was reached on the following key issues:
1 States may conduct maritime surveillance for 
peaceful purposes in areas claimed by other 
States as EEZ (Guideline IVb).
2 Subject to certain qualifications noted in the 
Guidelines, military vessels and aircraft have the 
right to navigate in, or fly over the EEZs of other 
States, and to engage in other internationally law­
ful uses of the sea associated with the opera­
tions of ships and aircraft (Guideline Va).
3 Ships and aircraft of a State undertaking military 
activities in the EEZ of another State have the 
obligation to use the ocean for peaceful purposes 
only, and to refrain from the threat or use of force, 
or provocative acts, such as stimulating or excit­
ing the defensive systems of the coastal State; 
collecting information to support the use of force 
against the coastal State; or establishing a ‘sea 
base’ within another State's EEZ without its con­
sent (Guideline Vb).
4 Military activities by a State in the EEZ of another 
State should not involve the deployment of sys­
tems that prejudice the defense or security of the 
coastal State, or interfere with or endanger the 
right of the coastal State to protect and manage 
its resources and environment (Guideline Ve).
5 Coastal State consent should in normal circum­
stances be granted for marine scientific research 
in the EEZ conducted exclusively for peaceful pur­
poses and in order to increase scientific know­
ledge of the marine environment for the benefit of 
all humanity (Guideline Villa).
6 Hydrographic surveying should only be conducted 
in the EEZ of another State with the consent of 
the coastal State (Guideline IXa).
7 Coastal State consent for hydrographic surveying 
should normally be granted unless the surveys 
fall within one of the consent categories in UNC­
LOS Article 246(5) (Guideline IXb).
Developments with Hydrographie 
Surveying-
In reaching consensus that hydrographic surveying 
in an EEZ should not be conducted without the con­
sent of the coastal State, the EEZ Group 21 appre­
ciated the many changes since UNCLOS III with the
practice and technology of hydrographic surveying 
and the utility of hydrographic data (Bateman,
2004, pp. 28-30). Apart from navigational safety, 
important applications of hydrographic knowledge 
include planning the exploration and exploitation of 
marine resources, the determination of seaward 
limits of national jurisdiction, coastal zone manage­
ment, national development (including building new 
ports and harbours), and the delimitation of mari­
time boundaries (Maschke, 1999, p.9). Also, with 
the great increase in concern over the health of the 
world's oceans and seas during the 10-15 years, 
including acceptance of the ‘soft law' in Chapter 
17 of Agenda 21 agreed at the United Nations Con­
ference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the full extent of the 
responsibility of the coastal States for stewardship 
of their EEZs on behalf of the international commu­
nity is now more fully appreciated.
Technology
Until the advent of Global Positioning Systems 
(GPS), it was extremely difficult for a hydrographic 
survey to be conducted without the support of the 
adjacent coastal State. Shore control was essen­
tial for accurate position fixing. It may not be a 
coincidence that hydrographic surveying in the EEZ 
has only become controversial over the last decade 
or so with the introduction of GPS. Prior to that 
time, most hydrographic surveys in the EEZ would 
only have been possible with the support of the 
coastal State because the accuracy of the survey 
depended on having shore stations in the vicinity of 
the survey area.
Integrated Oceans Management
Integrated oceans management that addresses 
oceans management on a cross-sectoral basis is 
now an accepted principle for domestic and region­
al action. Individual countries are developing 
national oceans policies to implement effective 
management arrangements for maritime zones 
under their national jurisdiction, Including the EEZ. 
At a regional level, the Seoul Oceans Declaration 
that resulted from the first meeting of Ocean-relat- 
ed Ministers of the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera­
tion (APEC) forum resolved at the domestic level to 
"Develop and promote, in an integrated manner, 
better coastal and oceans management using an 
ecosystem-based approach, including for sub­
regional seas, river basins and watersheds adja­
cent to coastal areas.'' Good hydrographic data is
an essential input to integrated oceans manage­
ment, and the responsibility for this in the EEZ 
rests clearly with the coastal State.
Sustainable Development
Hydrographic knowledge of adjacent waters is an 
element of national infrastructure and sustainable 
development (IHO, 2001, Chapter 1). Nautical 
charts provide for the safety of navigation and facil­
itate maritime economic activity generally, includ­
ing fishing, tourism and oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation. Hydrographic data in the EEZ has eco­
nomic value to the coastal State, which should be 
in a position to manage and control the release of 
such data, regardless of how and by whom it was 
collected. It is very hard these days to identify any 
hydrographic data, including that collected by mili­
tary surveying ships, which would not have some 
potential value to the coastal State. The coastal 
State requires such data to support developmental 
activities in the EEZ, both now and in the future, 
related to its sovereign rights for economic 
exploitation and its obligation to preserve and pro­
tect the marine environment of the zone. It might 
even be argued that hydrographic surveys now 
come within the scope of "other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration" of the EEZ, 
as in UNCLOS Article 56(l)(a).
Economic Value of Hydrographic Data
This argument can be taken further. Hydrographic 
data is a tradable commodity, as well as an essen­
tial element of the national infrastructure of the 
coastal State. The IHO has recognised this through 
its attention to the issue of copyright over hydro- 
graphic data. Navigational and hydrographic infor­
mation on nautical charts issued by one country 
may no longer be freely copied by another State on 
to its own nautical charts. Just as the coastal 
State regards marine scientific research data as 
within its control and jurisdiction, the same might 
be said about hydrographic data. It is not just the 
intended functional use of marine scientific 
research or hydrographic data (i.e. for economic 
purposes) that establishes the principle of coastal 
State jurisdiction, but also recognition that such 
data has value in its own right. It is virtually impos­
sible to say that hydrographic data collected today 
will not have some value in the future.
State Practice
State practice now appears to support the view
that hydrographic surveying in the EEZ is within the 
jurisdiction of the coastal State. For example, both 
Australia and Canada are understood to seek per­
mission of the coastal State before conducting 
hydrographic surveys in the EEZ of the other State, 
and other countries, including China, have specific 
legislation on the issue. Based on a survey con­
ducted by the United Nations (UN, 1989, pp. 143- 
154), national legislation governing the conduct of 
marine scientific research in waters under national 
jurisdiction generally does not specifically identify 
hydrographic surveying as different to marine sci­
entific research. While the fact that hydrographic 
surveying is not mentioned separately could sup­
port the argument that it is different to marine sci­
entific research, it seems rather more likely that 
coastal States in not mentioning it, are assuming 
that it is self-evident that it is captured by the 
marine scientific research legislation.
purposes, but the nature of the activity will be 
essentially the same regardless of the actual pur­
pose of the surveys.
The shaded areas in Figure 1 show the activities 
that, according to the arguments in this paper, are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State. 
These include all hydrographic surveying, regard­
less of whether it is conducted for military or civil­
ian purposes, and all marine scientific research 
with the exception of data collection, which is con­
ducted for purely military purposes and has no eco­
nomic value. The potential economic value or utili­
ty of the data collected in the EEZ has become an 
important criterion for distinguishing whether or 




Figure 1 is a graphical depiction based on the dis­
cussion in this paper of the overlap between 
marine scientific research, hydrographic surveying 
and military surveys. It shows the overlap between 
these three activities. Military surveys, particularly 
military oceanographic research, overlap to some 
extent with marine scientific research, but a lot of 
military surveying does not, particularly that which 
is more in the form of intelligence collection. Some 
forms of acoustic research would also have no 
commercial or economic value. As depicted by the 
small circle overlapping both marine scientific 
research and military surveys, hydrographic sur­
veying may be conducted both for civil and military










the jurisdiction of 
the coastal 
State.
Much has changed over the last 25 years and inter­
national law is still evolving with regard to the imple­
mentation of the EEZ regime. The Guidelines for Nav­
igation and Overflight in the EEZ produced by the 
EEZ Group 21 are intended to contribute to more 
effective implementation of the regime and 
improved oceans management generally. They 
reflect a clear view that hydrographic surveying in 
the EEZ should now come within the jurisdiction of 
the coastal State. Hydrographic data now has much 
wider application than just for the safety of naviga­
tion. It has many uses associated with the rights 
and duties of a coastal State in its EEZ. The practice 
and utility of hydrographic surveying have changed 
much since UNCLOS III, and the distinction between 
hydrographic surveying and marine scientific 
research is now much less 
than it might have been in 
the past.
Paradoxically the argu­
ments for military surveys 
in the EEZ being outside the 
jurisdiction of the coastal 
State appear stronger than 
those for hydrographic sur­
veying. The considerations 
that apply to the rights to 
conduct hydrographic sur­
veys and military surveys in 
an EEZ are essentially dif-
ferent. Military surveys might be more easily argued 
as an ancillary activity to the high seas freedoms of 
navigation and overflight available in the EEZ. The 
data collected is for military purposes only and is 
not normally released to the public, whereas hydro- 
graphic data, virtually by definition, has utility and 
economic value to the coastal State.
Copies of the EEZ Group 21 Guidelines are now to 
be distributed at a regional and international level. 
At the regional level, distribution will include APEC, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Region­
al Forum (ARF), the Council for Security Cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), and the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium (WPNS). At the international level, 
they will be sent to the UN Division for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the International Maritime 
Organisation, and the International Tribunal on the 
Law of the Sea. Individual members of the EEZ 
Group 21 have been asked to promote the Guide­
lines to their own national authorities.
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ANNEX A
Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone
Introduction
This document puts forward proposed ‘Guidelines 
for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Eco­
nomic Zone (EEZ)’ developed by a group of senior 
officials and analysts primarily from countries of the 
Asia-Pacific region participating in their personal 
capacities in a series of meetings held from 2002 -
2005.* The Guidelines are a set of non-binding, vol­
untary principles, which provide the basis for a com­
mon understanding and approach to issues arising 
from the implementation of the EEZ regime, particu­
larly in the Asia-Pacific region. The principles are 
based on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (the 1982 UNCLOS), State practice, and emerg­
ing ‘soft’ law.
Misunderstandings regarding military activities in 
foreign EEZs have become all too common. Major 
incidents include the March 2001 confrontation 
between the U.S. Navy survey vessel Bowditch and 
a Chinese frigate in China’s EEZ; the April 2001 col­
lision between a U.S. EP3 surveillance plane and a 
Chinese jet fighter over China’s EEZ; the December 
2001 Japanese Coast Guard pursuit of and firing at 
a North Korean spy vessel in its and China’s EEZ; 
and Vietnam’s protest against Chinese live fire exer­
cises in Vietnam’s claimed EEZ. Navies are expand­
ing and technology is advancing while coastal States 
are placing increasing importance on control over 
their EEZs. These opposing trends will result in a 
higher frequency and intensity of such incidents.
Other factors contribute to the problem. The scale 
and scope of maritime and airborne intelligence col­
lection activities is becoming more intensive and 
intrusive. They generate tension and produce defen­
sive reactions and escalatory dynamics. And new 
threats like trade in weapons of mass destruction, 
terrorism, piracy, and smuggling of arms, drugs and 
humans encourage both coastal and maritime 
States to extend their control or surveillance beyond 
their territorial seas, in some cases to others’ EEZs. 
Further, given the myriad boundary disputes and 
overlapping claims in the region, it is not always 
clear where one nation’s jurisdiction ends and 
another’s begins. Confusion and differences of opin­
ion regarding the regime governing military activities 
in the EEZ further complicates the issue.
Agreement on the EEZ concept included many com­
promises between coastal States and maritime 
powers resulting in intentional ambiguity in some 
of its provisions. It was formulated more than 25
years ago in very different political and technologi­
cal circumstances than those that exist at present. 
The ambiguities and lack of clarity should be exam­
ined in the light of these changed circumstances 
and evolving State practice with a view to reaching 
agreed interpretation.
Importance of These Guidelines
These Guidelines are important for three main rea­
sons. The first is the complexity of the Asian mari­
time environment with its unique combination of 
maritime geography, large areas of claimed EEZ, 
and many conflicting and overlapping claims to 
maritime jurisdiction. Second, recent incidents indi­
cate that there is considerable ambiguity and range 
of perspective in Asia with regard to the EEZ 
regime, particularly the rights and duties of the 
coastal State vis-à-vis those of user States. Third, 
coastal State legislation and offshore activities are 
beginning to conflict with increasing naval activities 
of non-coastal States in the region, including exer­
cises, intelligence gathering and research, and 
their accompanying technological developments. 
Tensions and misunderstandings may increase 
unless greater clarity and awareness of the EEZ 
regime are provided and agreed.
Purpose of the Guidelines
and certain terminology with regard to the activ­
ities that might be undertaken in an EEZ by for­
eign ships and aircraft.
Second, the Guidelines constitute an important 
regional confidence-building measure providing 
general principles for activities that some 
States currently regard as contentious.
Third, they will contribute to more effective 
oceans management in the region through 
improved understanding and more effective 
implementation of the EEZ regime.
Legal Status
The proposed Guidelines are non-binding in 
nature. They set out broad principles of common 
understanding regarding military and intelligence 
gathering activities in the EEZ but do not create 
legally binding obligations between States. In 
keeping with their non-binding nature, the Guide­
lines are framed in exhortatory rather than obliga­
tory language.
The Guidelines may be generally regarded as 
reflecting the need for better understanding of the 
rights and obligations of States conducting activi­
ties in the EEZ of another country. They represent 
a consensus among the participants on issues 
that are at present contentious and a potential 
source of tension and dispute in the region.
The Guidelines serve three main purposes:
1 First, they assist in clarifying the rights and 
duties of both coastal States and user States
ANNEX B
Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Preamble
Participants in the Dialogue on ‘The Regime of the 
EEZ: Issues and Responses':
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations concerning the maintenance of 
international peace and security and the promotion
of friendly relations between States;
Recognizing that the 1982 United Nations Conven­
tion on the Law of the Sea (the 1982 UNCLOS) 
establishes a new regime for the seas and oceans 
which balances fairly the interests of all States;
Affirming the duty of all States to utilise the oceans 
for peaceful purposes as stipulated in the 1982
UNCLOS Article 301;
Acknowledging the obligation of all States to pre­
serve and protect the marine environment;
Considering that the EEZ is neither high seas nor 
territorial sea and is subject to a specific legal 
regime under the 1982 UNCLOS;
Desiring to ensure the safety and security of nav­
igation in the EEZ;
Recognizing the rights, jurisdiction and duties of 
the coastal State in the EEZ as provided in Article 
56 of the 1982 UNCLOS;
Recognizing the rights and duties of other States in 
the EEZ as provided in Article 58 of the 1982 UNC­
LOS;
Recognizing a need for balance between the rights 
and duties of a coastal State in its EEZ and the 
rights and duties of other States;
Mindful that the sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
exercised by a coastal State in its EEZ differ from 
the sovereignty it exercises in its internal waters, 
archipelagic waters (if any), and territorial sea;
Recognizing that Article 300 of the 1982 UNCLOS 
prohibits the abuse of rights, jurisdiction and free­
doms recognised under the Convention;
Acknowledging the importance of resolving dis­
putes by peaceful means; and
Convinced that these Guidelines will promote 
understanding of the rights and duties of States 
conducting military and intelligence gathering activ­
ities in the EEZ of another State, and thus con­
tribute to peace, good order, and security at sea, 
particularly in the Asia Pacific region;
Hereby recommend the following non-binding 
Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the 
EEZ.
I. Definitions
a. For the purposes of these Guidelines:
1. 'abuse of rights’ means the unnecessary or
arbitrary exercise of rights, jurisdiction and free­
doms, or interference with the exercise of 
rights by another State, or the abuse or misuse 
of powers by a State causing injury to another 
State;
2. ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’ means an area 
referred to as such in relevant Articles of the 
1982 UNCLOS;
3. ’hydrographic survey’ means a survey having 
for its principal purpose the determination of 
data relating to bodies of water. A hydrograph­
ic survey may consist of the determination of 
one or several of the following classes of 
data: depth of water, configuration and nature 
of the seabed; directions and force of cur­
rents; heights and times of tides and water 
stages; and location of topographic features 
and fixed objects for survey and navigation 
purposes;
4. ‘marine environment’ is the physical, chemical, 
geological and biological components, condi­
tions and factors which interact and determine 
the productivity, state, condition and quality of 
the marine ecosystem, the waters of the seas 
and the oceans and the airspace above those 
waters, as well as the seabed and ocean floor 
and subsoil thereof;
5. ‘marine scientific research’ means activities 
undertaken in the marine environment to 
enhance scientific knowledge regarding the 
nature and natural processes of the seas and 
oceans, the seabed and subsoil;
6. ‘military activities’ means the operations of mil­
itary vessels, aircraft and devices, including 
intelligence gathering, exercises, trials, train­
ing, and weapons practices;
7. ‘military surveys’ refers to activities undertak­
en in the marine environment involving data col­
lection for military purposes;
8. ‘peaceful uses/purposes’ in the context of the 
EEZ means that uses of that zone, or the pur­
poses of activities conducted therein or there- 
above, must not threaten or use force;
9. ‘surveillance’ means the observation by visual 
or any technical means of activities on, over or 
under the seas and oceans; and
10.‘threat of force’ means a coercive attempt to 
compel another State to take or not to take 
certain specific action, or an action that is 
directed against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of that State, or 
against any of its assets or people, or taken
in any other manner inconsistent with the UN 
Charter.
II. Rights and duties of the coastal state
a. A coastal State may, in accordance with interna­
tional law, regulate navigation in its EEZ by 
ships carrying inherently dangerous or noxious 
substances in their cargo.
b. The coastal State should have due regard for 
other States' freedoms of navigation and over­
flight and of the laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses 
of the sea related to these freedoms, such as 
those associated with the operation of ships, 
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines.
c. Each State using another State’s EEZ should 
ensure that its vessels and aircraft with sover­
eign immunity, act, as far as is reasonable and 
practicable, in a manner consistent with the 
1982 UNCLOS.
d. In recognition of its rights and obligations with 
regard to the management of the marine environ­
ment and marine living and non-living resources, 
the coastal State may, on a temporary basis, 
place qualifications on the freedom of navigation 
in areas with special circumstances in its EEZ, 
such as major fishing grounds and marine pro­
tected areas. These arrangements may be made 
permanent by reference to the competent inter­
national organisation.
e. Any restriction on navigation and overflight 
imposed by a coastal State in its EEZ due to its 
weapons tests and exercises, or any other oper­
ational activity, should be temporary, in speci­
fied areas only, and only if such suspension is 
essential for the carrying out of such tests and 
exercises.
III. Rights and duties of other states
a. While exercising the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight in an EEZ, States should avoid activi­
ties that unreasonably prejudice the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State.
b. States' exercise of the freedoms of navigation 
and overflight should not interfere with or 
endanger the rights of the coastal State to pro­
tect and manage its own resources and their 
environment.
c. The exercise by other States of the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight should not interfere 
with the rights of the coastal State with regard 
to its establishment and use of artificial 
islands, installations and structures in its EEZ.
IV. Maritime surveillance
a. The right of a coastal State to conduct maritime 
surveillance in its EEZ should not be impeded 
by other States exercising their rights in that 
zone. In this context, the foreign State must 
have due regard to the rights and duties of the 
coastal State.
b. Maritime surveillance may be conducted by 
States for peaceful purposes in areas claimed 
by other States as EEZ. This surveillance 
should not prejudice the jurisdictional rights 
and responsibilities of the coastal State within 
its EEZ.
c. States should develop arrangements for the 
sharing of surveillance information with coastal 
States.
V. Military activities
a. With the exception of the qualifications noted 
elsewhere in these guidelines, military vessels 
and aircraft have the right to navigate in, or fly 
over the EEZs of other States, and to engage in 
other internationally lawful uses of the sea 
associated with the operations of ships and air­
craft.
b. Ships and aircraft of a State undertaking mili­
tary activities in the EEZ of another State have 
the obligation to use the ocean for peaceful pur­
poses only, and to refrain from the threat or use 
of force, or provocative acts, such as stimulat­
ing or exciting the defensive systems of the 
coastal State; collecting information to support 
the use of force against the coastal State; or 
establishing a ‘sea base’ within another State’s 
EEZ without its consent. The user State should 
have due regard for the rights of others to use 
the sea including the coastal State and comply 
with its obligations under international law.
c. Warships or aircraft of a State intending to 
carry out a major military exercise in the EEZ of 
another State should inform the coastal State 
and others through a timely navigational warn­
ing of the time, date and areas involved in the 
exercise, and if possible, invite observers from 
the coastal State to witness the exercise.
d. Military activities in the EEZ of other States 
should not hamper the search and rescue oper­
ations of the coastal State in its EEZ. States 
should co-operate in any such search and res­
cue operations.
e. Military activities by a State in the EEZ of 
another State should not involve the deploy­
ment of systems that prejudice the defense or 
security of the coastal State, or interfere with 
or endanger the right of the coastal State to 
protect and manage its resources and environ­
ment.
f. Military activities of a State in the EEZs of other 
States should not cause pollution or negatively 
affect the marine environment or marine living 
resources, including mammals. In particular, if 
prohibited by the laws of the coastal State, 
such activities in a coastal State’s EEZ should 
not involve live weapons fire, underwater explo­
sions or creation of sound waves and danger­
ous or radioactive materials that may directly or 
indirectly harm marine life or cause marine pol­
lution.
g. Military activities by another State should not 
be conducted:
1) in areas which have been announced by the 
coastal State as temporarily closed for the 
purposes of safety of navigation and over­
flight;
2) in areas with intensive fishing activities 
declared by the coastal State;
3) in areas with special circumstances adopt­
ed in accordance with Article 211 (6)(a) of 
the 1982 UNCLOS;
4) in marine parks or marine protected areas 
declared by the coastal State as required by 
Article 194 (5) of the 1982 UNCLOS;
5) in areas with intensive navigation and near 
sea lanes and traffic separation schemes; and
6) near submarine cables and pipelines on the 
seabed of the EEZ clearly marked by the 
coastal State on large-scale charts recog­
nised by the coastal State.
h. If there are high seas immediately adjacent to 
the coastal State's EEZ, a State undertaking 
military exercises should make every possible 
effort to limit them to the high seas.
VI. Non-interference with electronic
systems
a. The activities of another State in the EEZ of a 
coastal State should not interfere with the com­
munications, computer, and electronic systems 
of the coastal State, or make broadcasts that 
adversely affect the defense or security of the 
coastal State.
b. The coastal State should not interfere with the 
communications, computer, and electronic sys­
tems of vessels or aircraft of another State 
exercising its freedoms of navigation or over­
flight in or over the coastal State’s EEZ.
c. In order to make subparagraphs a and b effec­
tive, States should conclude agreements 
regarding mutual non-interference with commu­
nications, computer and electronic systems.
VII. Suppression of piracy and other 
unlawful activities
a. Ships in an EEZ are subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of their flag State, except in circum­
stances provided by the 1982 UNCLOS or other 
international treaties, 
h. States may act in an EEZ of another State to 
seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or air­
craft taken by piracy and under the control of 
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the 
property onboard,
h. To suppress terrorism and illicit traffic in drugs, 
persons, arms, and Weapons of Mass Destruc­
tion (WMD), their delivery systems, and related 
materials, States should:
1) board and search any vessel flying their flag 
in their EEZ that is reasonably suspected of 
transporting terrorists or being engaged in 
illicit traffic in drugs, persons, arms, and 
WMD, their delivery systems, or related 
materials, and seize such cargoes that are 
identified as such; and
2) consent, under appropriate circumstances, 
to the boarding and search of their own flag 
vessels by other States, and to the seizure of 
terrorists or drugs, persons, arms, and WMD- 
related cargoes on such vessels that may be 
mutually identified as such by both States.
d. The boarding and search of a foreign flag vessel 
in an EEZ without the consent of the flag State 
is not justified solely because it is suspected of
illegal trafficking in WMD, their delivery sys­
tems, or related materials,
e. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign ves­
sels in the EEZ of a coastal State, the arresting 
vessel shoùld through appropriate channels 
inform the coastal State of the action taken.
VIII. Marine scientific research
b. Coastal State consent should in normal circum­
stances be granted for marine scientific 
research conducted exclusively for peaceful pur­
poses and in order to increase scientific know­
ledge of the marine environment for the benefit 
of all humanity.
c. Marine scientific research that has direct use 
for living and non-living resource exploration 
and exploitation, conservation and manage­
ment is entirely under the jurisdiction of the 
coastal State, which is not obliged to grant con­
sent to such research by foreign vessels.
d. Overflight by manned or unmanned aircraft of 
one State over the EEZ of another State should 
not be conducted for the purpose of marine sci­
entific research without the consent of the 
coastal State.
e. States should fulfill their obligations to provide 
information to the coastal State in accordance 
with the 1982 UNCLOS Article 248, and to com­
ply with certain conditions in the 1982 UNCLOS 
Article 249, particularly with regard to the par­
ticipation of the coastal State in marine scien­
tific research projects.
IX. Hydrographic surveying
a. Hydrographic surveying should only be conduct­
ed in the EEZ of another State with the consent 
of the coastal State. This does not apply to the 
collection of navigational data by a ship 
required for safe navigation during the ship’s 
passage through an EEZ.
b. Coastal State consent for hydrographic survey­
ing should normally be granted unless the sur­
veys fall within one of the consent categories in 
the 1982 UNCLOS Article 246(5).
c. The Guidelines in Articles VIII and IX also apply 
to aircraft, Autonomous Underwater Vehicles 
(AUVs), Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) and 
other remotely operated devices of a State con­
ducting research or collecting data in an EEZ.
X . Transparency of legislation
a. Those States with policies and/or legislation 
regarding military activities in their EEZs should 
make them as transparent and as widely known as 
possible, including to the military authorities of 
other States that are frequently using or navigating 
their EEZs.
b. The dissemination or the receipt of the legisla­
tion by other States should not and does not 
constitute recognition of or refusal thereof by 
the receiving States of the legality of the legis­
lation, unless specifically so stated by the 
receiving States or authorities.
c. A copy of those laws should also be deposited 
with the UN Secretary-General, and be made 
available for easy reference by any interested 
States, authorities, or persons, with a view to 
increasing transparency and mitigating any hos­
tile intentions.
d. Military vessels and aircraft of a State exercis­
ing the freedoms of navigation and overflight in 
the EEZ of another State should observe and 
comply with the coastal State’s legislation on 
the basis of goodwill, or comply under protest.
e. Where States disagree, dialogue should be ini­
tiated either at the bilateral or regional level.
XI. Non-prejudicial clause
a. Nothing contained in these Guidelines, or activi­
ties taking place pursuant to them, should be 
interpreted as prejudicing the position of any 
State in its claims to sovereign rights or jurisdic­
tion in its claimed EEZ, or its rights and respon­
sibilities therein under the 1982 UNCLOS.
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